

3월 독회 발표 자료

Introduction

Between 1916 and 1918, Eliot was steadily moving toward a career in literature. Starting with three brief reviews in 1916, he published fourteen literary pieces in 1917 and eighteen in 1918.

Despite his achievements, however, Eliot's three years in wartime London had been surreal, leaving not only him but London dazed and shattered. For Eliot, the catalogue of nightmares included descending bombs, maimed or slain friends, grinding poverty, a failed marriage, and a chronically ill wife. He was himself ill . . . In Christmas letter to the mother-in-law, Vivien tells of the influenza pandemic and Tom's fear of madness.

Leibniz's Monads and Bradley's Finite Centres

In Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, I seemed to find features strikingly similar to Leibniz's monadism.

1. 선구자/ Bruno

similarity between Bruno's theory and that of Leibniz

A kind of pre-established harmony, the continuity of animal and vegetable and of organic and inorganic, the representation of the whole in part, even the words the monad of monads.

difference: window/less monads

it is just the impenetrability of the Leibnizian monads which constitutes their originality and which seems to justify our finding a likeness between Leibniz and Bradley.

2. 라이프니츠 사상 전반에 대한 평가.

The complication of his interest in physics, his interests in logic, and his equally genuine interest in theology make his views a jungle of apparent contradictions and irrelevances.

His solicitude for the preservation of human immortality leads to a view which is only an excrescence upon monadism, which is less valuable than Aristotle's,

3. 라이프니츠와 브래들리의 단자론적 유사성

the resemblance between Leibniz's and Bradley's view:

complete isolation of monads from each other

sceptical theory of knowledge, relativist theory of space, time, and relations

a form of anti-intellectualism in both writers

the indestructibility of the monads

the important doctrine of expression

Leibniz's theory of degrees of perfection among monads approximates to a theory of degrees of reality.

from the pluralism of Leibniz, there is only a step to the "absolute zero" of Bradley, and Bradley's Absolute dissolves at a touch into its constituents.

4. 문제점: 인식론/ 전체와 개체/ 현실성 /상상 혹은 가상/자기-확증/주체

개체(유한 중심/모나드)와 전체 (우주/절대): 실재(reality)의 문제

Just as Leibniz's pluralism is ultimately based upon faith, so Bradley's universe, actually in finite centres, is only by an act of faith.

Like monads, they aim at being one; each expanded to completion, to the full reality latent within it, would be identical with the whole universe.

But in so doing it would lose the actuality, the here and now, which is essential to the small reality which it actually achieves

B: The Absolute responds only to an imaginary demand of thought and satisfies only imaginary demand of feeling

Pretending to be something which makes finite centres cohere, it turns out to be merely assertion that they do.

L: not solve the question of what makes real subject, what the individuation is;

unclear differentiation between substantial and accidental unities;

the omnipresence of substance (distinction between substance/predicate(attribute)

monads (in/animated bodies)

the permanence of monads seems to assert itself in order to save a theory

5. 관념론의 문제: 관념의 산물 /비실재성

It is difficult for Bradley as for Leibniz to maintain that there is any world at all, to find any objects for these mirrors to mirror.

The world of both is ideal construction

B: Nothing is real, except experience present in finite centres

For both of them:

Relations are the work of the mind

Time exists only from finite points of view

their view of space is relativistic

The world, for Bradley, is simply the intending of a world by several souls and

centres.

Each finite is, "while it lasts," the whole world (유아론[solipsism]의 문제)

6. 대상/공동 세계/

B:

an object is a common intention of several souls cut out from immediate experience.

The genesis of the common world(p. 466 하단) :

its origin in time; our similar experience of the same objects; yet, our experiences as "intellectual constructions"

my experience, essentially public; my emotion better understood by others than by myself

on the other hand, everything, the whole world, is private to myself.

7. 유한 중심/ 모나드/ 자아 / 영혼 / 관점

the meaning of soul, finite center, self are provisional and relative

A self is an ideal and largely a practical construction; the self is a construction in space and time; an object among others and could not exist save in a common world.

The soul is almost the same as finite center; The soul cannot be acted upon by other entities, since a finite centre is a universe in itself.

The soul only differs from the finite center in being considered as something not identical with its states

The finite center is immediate experience; it has no duration through which it lasts; it has in a sense its own past and future

This is more clearly the case with the soul ; but, it does not bear trace of everything that happens it:

L: would not confuse the soul which is a whole world, to which nothing comes except as its own attribute and adjective, with the soul which can be described by its way of acting upon an environment. (본질적 영혼과 일상적 영혼 -)

The point of view from which each soul is a world in itself must not be confused with the point of view from which each soul is the only the function of a physical organism.

the two point of view; irreconcilable yet co-existent; they melt into each other by a process which we can grasp.

B: Bradley's theory of transcendence: pass to the point of view from which the soul is the entelechy of its body

what we know is that we are able to pass from one point of view to another;

the higher experience explains the lower is at least open to doubt.

L: it is the failure to deal adequately with transcendence which makes Leibniz

appear so fantastic, and puts him sometimes to such awkward shifts.

8. 라이프니츠의 모나디즘의 문제점

L:

while he makes the soul the entelechy of the body, is forced to have recourse to the theory of the dominant monad

superfluous

It is an attempt to preserve the reality of the external world at the same time that it is denied.

all pan-psychism (범심론)

the monad combines several points of view in one; the co-existence and independence of the monads; the pre-established harmony (mysterious solution-)

9. 최종 비교

Bradley's monadism is in some ways a great advance beyond Leibiz's

Its technical excellence is impeccable;

it unquestionably presents clearness where in Leibniz we find confusion

Mr. (??) Bradley is much more skillful, much more finished philosopher than Leibniz.

In Leibniz there are possibilities. He has the permanence of the pre-Socrates, of all imperfect things.

The Development of Leibniz's monadism

1. 사상적 형성의 원천

Bruno, Maimonides, the Averrhoists, Spinoza, Hebrew and Arabic studies, esp. the study of the Kabbala, Plato, Aristotle, scholar philosophers, Descartes, genuine passion for theology

2. 아리스토텔레스/ 실체/ 개별과 보편의 문제

Leibniz's view of substance is derived from Aristotle; it is Aristotle's theory filtered through scholasticism and tintured by atomism and theology.

Aristotle's definition: "substance is that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated.

Wherever Aristotle pursues the concept of substance, it eludes him.

the substance is the form of the species, in which case it breaks loose from the concrete thing and gives rise to the same difficulties which Aristotle censured in Plato; or it is the individual thing, in which case there is no definition and no knowledge.

Is the substance the compound of matter and form or the form alone?

A's inconsistent propositions: there are no forms of individuals//the form and the matter compose one whole.

A's account of matter is fundamentally a relativistic one:

matter has various meanings in various contexts in relation to shifting points of view; no absolute meaning in various contexts /points of view

should not regard matter as a "thing"

3. 아리스토텔레스와 라이프니츠의 차이점

Aristotle is too keen a metaphysician to start from a naive view of matter or from a one-sided spiritualism. To a certain extent Leibniz keeps this middle ground too. But his metaphysics tends to fall apart, as the result his inherited nominalism and the fissure between

the ancient distinction between matter and form does not correspond to the modern distinction between, since Descartes, of matter and spirit; this dichotomy is as strongly marked in Leibniz as in Descartes.

For A, matter and form were always relative, but never identical

For L, matter and spirit are absolutely reals, but are really (as for Spinoza) the same thing.

4. 라이프니츠의 문제 1: 물리학과 형이상학의 충돌

Starting as a physicist, Leibniz naturally assumes that matter is not a relative term but something absolute,

The substantiality of matter consists then in the concept of force (cf, Descartes, extension)

The theory of forces, as the substance of which material changes are the states, is not the theory of the soul which derives from his more theological interest.

From his physical point of view he cannot arrive at self-consciousness, so that his doctrine of force has two grounds: the theory of dynamics and the *feeling* of activity.

Something is the subject, but it is not the *I* which I know, or which anybody knows; Force becomes one.

Against such a conclusion (completely naturalistic) Leibniz was set, (1)because it ceases to have any value for physics and (2) because it interferes with our claim for personal immortality.

Force is indestructible, and will continue in various manifestations; from the

physical side, the monad is truly immortal; But force (and the monad) is entirely impersonal

5. 라이프니츠의 문제 2: 유명론과 신비주의

Commencing with an analysis of the nature of matter, L is led to the view of a universe consisting of centers of force.

From this point of view the human soul is merely one of these forces, and its activity should be reducible to physical laws.

Under the influence of an Aristotelian doctrine of substance, he comes to conclusions which are not at all Aristotelian, by his nominalistic assumption that substance is particulars

From a materialist atomism he is led to a spiritualistic atomism [monadism].

Without recourse to mysticism, the reason why a monad should pass from the unconscious to the conscious state, why a monad composing the body of father or mother should suddenly be elected to domination over a new body of monads remain unsolved.

6. 라이프니츠의 문제 3: 불멸의 모나드(영혼)와 관념론

Leibniz's theory of soul is, like that of Descartes, derives from scholasticism; remote from that of either Plato, Aristotle or Plotinus; for them, the soul is a substance in a sense which does not include personal immortality.

The classification of Aristotle (plant, animal, human being) on the basis of biological functions.

For L, the distinction is not biological but psychological

the definition of monads as "points of view" === entirely modern

whereas for A matter exists only in contrast with form, and formed matter may be the matter for a higher form, for L matter really exist independently of spirit, but is really spirit.

7. 라이프니츠의 문제 3: 물질과 정신, 몸과 영혼; matter and spirit body and soul

With Leibniz the relation of matter and mind is closer, the relation of body and soul more remote than with Aristotle.

Matter is an arrested moment of mind, "mind without memory; the monad at any instant of time.

The weakness in L's theory of body and soul may be due to two causes: on the one hand, his theological bias made separation of body and soul essential, on the other hand, it was necessary, for his more strictly philosophical argument, that the monad should persist after the compound substances, the bodies, which are their

points of view.

The causal series which is the monad should apparently have no last term.

At very moment, there will be a new series of series.

Every moment will see a new universe

Some sort of persistence is necessary for the system, though not the personal immortality which Leibniz is interested in supporting.

8. 결론: 라이프니치 사상의 철학적 위상

The monad is a reincarnation of the form which is the formal cause of Aristotle.

But it is more and less.

No philosophy contains more various possibilities of development; no philosophy unities more various influences.

That he did not always unite them successfully — that he never quite reconciled modern physics, medieval theology, and Greek substance, is not to be reproved when we consider the magnitude of his task and the magnitude of his accomplishment.